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566 LITIGATING THE CONTROVERSY Ch. 27
Verdict on that Issue, it would seem that a Judgment according to the Verdict should ordinarily be Entered.2 Frequently, how- ever, an Error by Either One or Both Par- ties, prevents a presentation of the Issue on the Pleadings in such a manner so as to make possible a decision of the controversy, or it may be that an Error on the Part of the Court may result in a failure to correctly determine the Issue as made by the Plead- ings. Thus, for example, if A sues B in Case for Slander, alleging that B spoke of and con- cerning A, stating that A is a liar, A is not entitled to recovery, even though a Jury finds the Facts as A alleged, if the alleged state- ment is derogatory language which, as a Mat- ter of Substantive Law, is not actionable even if proven. And if, by Way of Defense, B al- leges that he was merely repeating what someone else said, this Fact, if true, consti- tutes No Defense as a Matter of Substantive Law. In either case a Verdict by the Jury would not constitute a sufficient basis to war-

2. But such was not the case, as Ticld explains. He declared:
“After a General Veivlicf, or upon a Writ of Inquiry, either on Demurrer or Judgment by Default, it is incumbent on the prevailing party to enter a Rule for Judgment Nisi Causa, on the Postea or Inquisi- tion, with the Clerk of the Rules. This Rule expires in four days Exclusice ce after it is entered and Sun- dai, or any other day on which the Court doth not sit, is not reckoned one of the four days, unless the ilule be entered on the last day of the term, or w thin four (lays after ; (luring which four days, it is the Practice to enter these rules, as of the last day of the term and at the expiration of four days exclusive after entering such rule, if no sufficient cause be shown to the contrary, Judg- ment may be entered. The Rule for Judgment ought not to be entered before the day in bank; and it is not necessary if the plaintiff be nonsuited, for in that case Judgment may be entered immediately after the (lay in bank.
"Within the time limite(i by the Rule, the unsuccessful party may move the Court for a New Trial, or In- quiry; or in Arrest of Judgment; or for Judgment Non Obst ante Veredkto, a Repleader, or Venire Facias De Novo." 2 The Practice of the Court of King’s Bench, in Personal Actions, c. XXXVIII, Of New Trials; and Arrest of Judgment, &c. 813 (Philadelphia 1807).
rant a Judgment. As a Verdict is therefore not necessarily decisive of the Cause, the Court, in considering an appropriate Motion should thoroughly examine the Pleadings for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Facts alleged by the victorious Party will sustain a Judgment in his favor. And in some cases the conduct of the Trial may have to be con- sidered, particularly with reference to the Rulings of the Court on offers and rejections of evidence, some of which may operate to invalidate a Verdict. To meet these even- tualities and to give an opportunity for the losing party to examine the Record and the Trial, at Common Law the Entry of the Judgment was delayed. This resulted in Eng- lish Practice from the circumstance that Nisi Prius Trials were usually held out on the Circuit away from Westminster, during a Vacation of the Court, and therefore the Record Roll, with the Entry of the Ver- dict, could not be presented to the Full Court for Judgment, until after the Commencement of the Next Term. Within four days after the Court met En Banc at Westminster, the Losing Party at the Nisi Prius Trial was permitted any Motion seeking to avoid the Judgment which in the normal course of affairs would logically follow upon a Ver- dict.3 A similar Rule has usually been fol- lowed in the American Courts, except where changed by Rule of Court or Statute.4 The effort to avert the Entry of Judgment on the Verdict took the Form of One or More Motions, which, as Professor Keigwin ob- serves, “because they look backward over the course of the proceeding, may be called Re- trospective Motions,” which were Five in

3.
Keigwin, Cases in Common Law Pleading, Bk. II,
The Rules of Pleading, c. XVIII, Retrospective Motions, § 166, Effect of the Verdict, 767, n 1 (2d ed., Rochester 1934).

4.
Truett v. Legg, 32 Md. 117 (1870); Hutchinson v.
Brown, 8 App.D.C. 157 (1896).
5.
Keigwin, Cases in Common Law Pleading, Bk. II,
The Rules of Pleading, c. XVIII, Retrospective Mo- tions, 768 (2d ed., Rochester 1934).

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