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tiff is entitled to the Judgment of the Court, although a Verdict has been found against him. In the other case, that he is not enti- tled to the Judgment of the Court, although a Verdict has been delivered in his favor. Like the Motion for Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto, that in Arrest of Judgment must always be grounded upon something Appar- ent on the Face of the Pleadings; for instance, if, in an Action against the indorser of a Bill of Exchange, the plaintiff were to omit to allege in his Declaration that the defendant had notice of dishonor, Judgment would be Arrested even after a Verdict in the plain- tiff’s favor.

“The power to make these respective Mo- tions, coupled with the inability to Demur and Plead at the Same Time, led to a prac- tice of passing over Objections to the Plead- ings until After the Trial, when it was too late to Amend, and the successful litigant was often deprived of the fruits of a Verdict ac- cording to the merits by a slip in the Plead- - ings, which might have been remedied if brought to his notice by Demurrer.” 41

An utter failure to keep in view the proper Functions of Pleading is strikingly shown when a Fair Trial on the merits of a case is set at naught by a Motion in Arrest of Judg- ment, by Judgment Notwithstanding the Ver- dict, or even on Writ of Error, because of a lack of some Allegation in the Declaration. And some have regarded such an outcome a perversion of Justice by the Rules of Proce- dure, resulting from the blind and mechanical application of Rules for their own sake. Of course, all too often, astute practitioners, in- stead of giving gratuitous instructions to their opponents, permit them to go through the Trial on Defective Pleadings, and then wipe out all the results of the Trial if it goes against them, by Motion in Arrest of Judgment, or a Similar Motion.

In referring to this type of practice, in the Illinois case of Giliman v. Chicago Railway Co.,42 Craig, J., in dissenting, declared: "The defendant, if not sufficiently informed of the Statement of Claim, had the right to demand a more Specific Statement, but instead of that it filed an Affidavit of Merits, in which it reserved the right to object to any insuffi- ciency of plaintiff’s claim, went to Trial, and had a Fair Trial on the Merits, and, having been unsuccessful in the Trial, now asks that the Judgment be Reversed because the Statement of Claim did not set out a Com- plete Cause of Action.” The majority of the Court failed to appreciate that the main Function of Pleading is to clear the ground preparatory to the Trial. The need of a formal “basis for the Judgment” is not a sufficient reason for permitting such Objec- tions to Pleadings to be raised and be availed of after a Trial on the Merits, unless it is shown that the defendant was actually pre- vented from having a Fair Trial by reason of the Defect.

In some States, a defendant, when a Demur- rer has been erroneously overruled, may not Move in Arrest of Judgment; yet he may Move for Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto, or he may secure a Reversal of the Judgment on Writ of Error.44 But it has been well said that “a Court, by Ruling Wrongly on a Demurrer, does not preclude itself from aft- erwards Ruling Rightly upon a Motion in Arrest of Judgment.” 45